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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
MELVIN DEAN FRAME, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 02-1002 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
POINT I 
Was evidence that, before defendant fatally stabbed 
Charles Bovee, defendant had threatened to "mess [the victim] up1 
and that defendant threatened to stab the victim and was only 
concerned that, if he did, a witness would tell the police, 
sufficient to establish that defendant: intended to kill the 
victim; intended to cause the victim serious bodily harm; or, 
acting with depraved indifference to human life, engaged in 
conduct creating a gross risk of death to another? 
POINT II 
Did defendant meet his burden of proving that defense 
counsel, acting in a manner that was not within the realm of 
reasonable trial tactics, rendered a performance that was 
deficient in some demonstrable manner and that, absent that 
deficiency, it is reasonably likely that the verdict would have 
been different? 
EXK£EISE)3T-QE-.TBB-£&SB 
Defendant/ Melvin Dean Frame, was charged with second 
degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1983) (R. 1). 
Defendant was convicted in a jury trial held September 
12 and 13f 1985, in the Seventh Judicial District Court in and 
for Uintah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard C. 
Davidson, Judge, presiding (Tr. 309). Defendant was sentenced by 
Judge Davidson on October 6, 1985 to an indeterminate term of 
five years to life in the Utah State Prison (Transcript of 
Hearing in Motion for New Trial 7-8). 
EEKXEtiEaST-QI-TBE-EZCTS 
On or about July 5, 1985, defendant agreed to accompany 
Charles Bovee, aka "Huck," and William Otto on a trip from Denver 
to Grand Junction, Colorado (Tr. 236-37). They were to travel in 
Bovee1s blue Ford truck (Tr. 237). En route to Grand Junction, 
about twenty-five miles west of Denver, the trio picked up a 
hitchhiker, Emmanuel Randy Shaffer (Tr. 122). The group reached 
Grand Junction on July 6, 1985 (Tr. 126). They spent two nights 
in that area and then proceeded toward Vernal, Utah (Tr. 126-29). 
They reached Vernal at about noon. Bovee and Otto went 
into the Gateway saloon while defendant and Shaffer slept. They 
left the saloon about an hour later (Tr. 129). Bovee then 
visited his sister's house and took from there a leather jacket 
that they sold to buy liquor (Tr* 130). The group went swimming, 
ate some lunch, drank some more beer and then went back to the 
Gateway saloon (Tr. 131) . All four travelers entered the bar. 
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After a while Bovee told defendant and Shaffer that they should 
go try to make some money. Shaffer and defendant went outside 
and spotted two sleeping bags. They decided to steal the bags so 
they could sell them (Tr. 132-33). While they were stealing the 
bags, Shaffer noticed that a woman was watching them. They 
completed the theft and hid in the weeds until Otto came out of 
the saloon. Otto spoke to the woman who witnessed the theft and 
went back into the bar. Defendant and Shaffer returned to the 
saloon to convince Bovee and Otto that they should leave before 
the woman called the police (Tr. 133-34). Bovee was angry at 
defendant and Shaffer because they had placed the stolen items in 
his truck (Tr. 134). 
All four left the saloon. Bovee was driving the truck 
and Otto was riding in the passenger seat. Defendant and Shaffer 
were riding in the bed of the truck. While they were stopped at 
a stop light defendant and Shaffer heard Bovee complain that they 
had ruined his chances of getting a job by stealing the sleeping 
bags (Tr. 137). Defendant was stabbing a mattress with his 
knifef he told Shaffer that if Bovee "messed with him again he 
would mess him up." (Tr. 137-38). Defendant also asked Shaffer 
if he would tell the police if defendant stabbed Bovee (Tr. 138). 
Bovee pulled the truck into the parking lot of the 
Yellow Front store. Bovee and Otto stepped out of the truck and 
began fighting. Shaffer and defendant jumped out of the truck. 
Defendant kicked Bovee in the face a couple of times and then 
Shaffer pulled Otto off Bovee (Tr. 140-41). Bovee Stood up and 
kicked defendant (Tr. 142). Defendant lunged toward Bovee, 
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waiving his knife in the air (Tr. 114, 120) and Otto rejoined the 
scuffle. Bovee then staggered back into the street clutching his 
chest (Tr. 142-44). Otto ran and started the truck. Defendant 
stood for a minutef with his knife still in his hand, and then 
jumped into the back of the truck (Tr. 144-45). Shaffer remained 
at the scene and tried to assist Bovee. Defendant and Otto drove 
off (Tr. 146). 
Bovee died shortly thereafter of a knife wound to the 
left chest (Tr. 175). The state medical examiner testified that 
the wound had been inflicted with such force that the fifth rib 
was completely severed and the knife pierced the right posterior 
ventricular wall of the heart (Tr. 198). 
Defendant and Otto were almost immediately pulled over 
and taken into custody by the Roosevelt city police (Tr. 160-66). 
The truck was impounded and subsequently searched. The search 
revealed a knife hidden next to the spare tire in the bed of the 
truck (Tr. 188). The knife was sent to state crime lab. The lab 
verified that there was human blood on the blade of the knife 
(Tr. 229-30). 
The victimf Mr. Boveef was wearing a knife in a sheath 
on his belt during the fight. However, the evidence indicates 
that the knife remained in its sheath throughout the incident. 
An officer removed the knifef still in its sheath, from the 
victim after the stabbing. The knife was tested at the state 
crime lab. There was human blood on the knife handle; however 
the only blood on the blade was not of human origin (230-31). 
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An eyewitness to the fight testified that Bovee, who 
was dressed in a light blue shirt and was barefoot (Tr. 145)
 f was 
in the center of the fight trying to fend off both defendant who 
was not wearing a shirt (Tr. 145)f and Otto. Shaffer was trying 
to break up the fight (Tr. 101-02). 
The evidence indicated that defendant was intoxicated 
at the time of the stabbing. His blood alcohol level two hours 
after the incident was .17 percent (Tr. 204). Howeverf expert 
testimony established that at blood alcohol levels as high as .2 
which would account for metabolism from the time of the stabbing 
to the time of the blood testf a person is able to understand the 
consequences of their actions (Tr. 214). Furtherf the officer 
that arrested defendant shortly after the stabbing testified 
that, although he could tell defendant had been drinkingf 
defendant was not intoxicated to the point that he was unable to 
understand (Tr. 262). 
IDIHT-J 
The facts indicate that, before defendant fatally 
stabbed Charles Bovee, he threatened to "mess [the victim] up." 
Further, the evidence indicated that defendant, while he was 
considering stabbing the victim, expressed only one concern-
whether or not a witness would tell the police about the 
stabbing. Defendant then entered a fight between the victim and 
another person. Defendant took an unsheathed knife into the 
fight, although the victim fought only with his bare hands and 
feet. During the fight, defendant stabbed the victim with enough 
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force to completely sever a rib and pierce the victim1 s heart. 
Defendant had been drinking prior to the altercation; however, 
the evidence indicated that he was not intoxicated to the point 
of being unable to understand the consequences of his actions. 
In view of that evidencef it was reasonable for the 
jury to conclude that defendant intended to kill Charles Bovee, 
or at least intended to cause the victim serious bodily harm. 
The jury could also have reasonably concluded that defendant, 
acting under circumstances that showed depraved indifference to 
human lifef engaged in conduct that caused a gross risk of death 
to another. Consequently, the evidence was sufficient to support 
the verdict of second degree murder. 
JJQIfflLU 
In order to sustain a claim of ineffective counsel, 
defendant must prove: (1) that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner; (2) that performance was 
not within the wide range of actions that might be considered 
reasonable trial tactics; and (3) the outcome of the trial would 
probably have been different but for counsel's error. 
Defendant claims that counsel's performance was 
ineffective because he was the only witness called on behalf of 
the defense. However, defendant does not explain who else should 
have been called or what impact the additional witnesses would 
have had on the outcome of the trial. Therefore defendant has 
failed to show that counsel1s performance was deficient in some 
demonstrable manner, beyond the scope of reasonable trial tactics 
or that, without the defect, the verdict would have been 
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different. Defendant also failed to explain how the alleged 
failure of counsel to prepare hira to testify affected his 
testimony or how the verdict would have been different if he had 
been thoroughly coached before he testified. Therefore, 
defendant has failed to prove that counsel's performance was 
ineffective because he failed to adequately prepare defendant to 
testify. Defendant further alleges that counsel's performance 
was ineffective because he failed to raise enough objections 
during trial. Defendant points to only once instance supporting 
that contention-where the court noted that the prosecutor had 
been asking leading questions without objection from defense 
counsel. Howeverr this will not support a claim of ineffective 
counsel because it is generally held that the decision of whether 
or not to object to leading questions is a matter of trial 
strategy. Moreover, the crucial evidence was elicited without 
improper questioning. Therefore it is unlikely that the verdict 
would have been different even if counsel had objected to the 
leading questions. Further, counsel did not render a deficient 
performance simply because he failed to raise an objection for 
cause against Juror Smuin and did not remove her with a 
peremptory challenge. Whether or not to remove a juror is a 
tactical decision and counsel is not obligated to raise 
objections that would be fruitless. Juror Smuin only expressed a 
belief that, because someone died, somebody, somewhere was 
responsible. She maintained that she had no preconceived notions 
about defendant's guilt and indicated that she could give 
defendant a fair trial. Such light impressions are not the sort 
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that evidence implied bias and would not have justified excusing 
Ms. Smuin for cause. Thereforer defense counsel properly 
abstained from raising an objection for cause. Defense counsel's 
opening and closing arguments were also well within the realm of 
reasonable trial tactics as they appropriately marshalled the 
facts for the jury and directed the jury's attention to the 
court's instructions on the crucial law. Further any deficiency 
in those arguments was cured through detailed jury instructions; 
therefore it is unlikely that, absent the deficiency, the verdict 
would have been different. 
Finally, looking at counsel's performance as a whole, 
it is apparent that he competently and zealously represented the 
interest of defendant. Counsel sought and obtained suppression 
of evidence gathered in violation of defendant's right to 
privacy. Counsel cross-examined the State's witnesses and argued 
to the court that the State failed to prove the mens rea 
necessary to make out a prima facie case of second degree murder. 
In view of the strong evidence against defendant, it is not 
surprising that counsel's tactics did not succeed. Therefore, 
defendant has failed to meet his burden of proving that counsel's 
performance did not meet constitutional standards. 
ABGDIUNT 
JDIM2LJ 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a verdict of second degree murder. The jury was properly 
instructed, in accord with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 
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1983), that in order to find defendant guilty of second degree 
murder they must determine. 
(a) That the defendant, Melvin Dean Frame, 
intentionally or knowingly caused the death 
of Charles Kevin Bovee at the time and place 
alleged in the information, or (b) intending 
to cause serious bodily injury to another did 
commit an act clearly dangerous to human life 
that caused the death of Charles Kevin Bovee, 
or, (c) Acting under circumstances evidencing 
a depraved indifference to human life, he 
engaged in contact which created a gross risk 
of death to another and thereby caused the 
death of Charles Kevin Bovee. 
(R. 62). Although the general verdict did not reveal which 
section the jury relied on to convict the defendant, the evidence 
was sufficient to support the verdict under any of the 
alternatives set out in the instruction. 
This Court's standard of review for sufficiency of the 
evidence is that the jury's determination should be reversed only 
if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, the Court finds that it "is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." StatSSjL-RQXballf 669 P.2d 1338, 1339 
(Utah 1984) fiiiins jSJt3±.e_Y.*_P££x.eje, 689 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 
1983); S±ate_Y^ itet.fcSr 675 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983) (applying 
the standard of review to a verdict of second degree murder). 
In the instant case there is sufficient credible 
evidence that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the 
death of Charles Bovee to justify a verdict of second degree 
murder under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (a). The evidence 
indicated that prior to the altercation defendant had been 
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stabbing a styrofoam mattress in the back of the truck with his 
knife. Defendant explained that he liked to stick his knife into 
things (Tr. 251). During that time defendant heard Mr. Bovee 
make derogatory statements about him. Defendant turned to Mr. 
Shaffer and stated that, if Bovee messed with him, he would mess 
him (Bovee) up. Defendant also asked Mr. Shaffer if he would 
tell the cops if defendant stabbed Bovee. When the fight started 
between Bovee and Otto, defendant jumped out of the truck with 
his knife in. He kicked Bovee in the head several times while 
Otto was holding Bovee down. Bovee stood up and kicked defendant 
with his bare foot. Defendant again started to fight with Bovee 
and, almost immediately, Mr. Bovee sustained a mortal knife wound 
to the chest that was administered with sufficient force to cut 
entirely through a rib and pierce the heart. 
Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, it was 
reasonable for the jury to conclude, from defendant's statements 
and the force of the blow that killed Mr. Bovee, that defendant 
intended to kill the decedent. Further, the jury could have 
concluded that, because defendant admitted that he liked to play 
with his knife, defendant knew the dangers of the weapon and knew 
that entering a fight with the weapon in hand and thrusting the 
knife at a person's chest was reasonably certain to cause death. 
Therefore, the jury could have found that defendant knowingly 
caused the death of Charles Bovee. 
Moreover, even if the evidence is somehow viewed as 
insufficient to prove that defendant intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of Charles Bovee, it was certainly sufficient to 
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establish that he caused the death while intending to commit 
serious bodily injury, thereby justifying a verdict of second 
degree murder under § 76-5-203(b). Defendant's statements, to 
the effect that he would "mess up" the decedent and was 
considering stabbing him, amply evidence his intent to cause 
serious bodily injury. That intent was played out first when 
defendant kicked the victim in the head and then when he 
continued to fight with the victim, while waiving his knife in 
the air, subsequently stabbing him. 
Defendant infers that he was unable to form the 
specific intents needed to satisfy § 76-5-203(a) & (b) because he 
was intoxicated. Defendant's premise is correct; intoxication 
can be a defense to a crime if it negates the existence of a 
mental state that is an element of the offense. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-306 (1978). However, in order to establish a defense of 
voluntary intoxication one must do more than simply show that 
they had been drinking and were intoxicated before the incident 
in question. In order to establish such a defense, one must 
prove that, due to the intoxication, their mind was affected to 
such a degree that they did not have the ability to form the 
requisite specific intent. 5±3±£_Y^_.Eosi3, 648 P.2d 71, 90 (Utah 
1982). In the instant case the defendant failed to meet that 
standard. 
In addition to defendant's own statements prior to the 
altercation, which indicated his mental awareness of the 
situation, the State's expert testimony indicated that an 
individual with a blood alcohol level equivalent to that of 
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defendant two hours after the stabbing, would be able to 
understand what they were doing and the consequences of their 
actions. The expert also stated that an individual with a blood 
alcohol even greater than defendant's (to account for metabolism 
between the stabbing and the blood test) would be able to 
understand their actions and the consequences thereof. Further, 
the officer that arrested defendant shortly after the stabbing 
testified that defendant seemed perfectly able to understand. 
This opinion was corroberated by the officer who interrogated 
defendant after the killing. Under those circumstances, there is 
no indication that defendant's drinking impaired his ability to 
form the requisite mens rea for second degree murder under § 76-
5-203(a) & (b). 
Finallyf the evidence is sufficient to establish that 
defendant, acting under circumstances evidencing depraved 
indifference to human life, engaged in conduct that created a 
grave risk of death to another thereby causing the death of 
Charles Bovee. Consequently, the jury was justified in finding 
defendant guilty of second degree murder under § 76-5-203(c). 
The standard for depraved indifference under § 76-5-
203(c) was explained by this Court in StatSSjL-EQntaixa# 6 80 P.2d 
1042, 1047 (Utah 1984), where the court required a showing that: 
1. The defendant engaged in conduct that 
created a grave risk of death to another; and 
2. At the time he so acted, the defendant 
knew that his conduct created a grave risk of 
death to another; and 
3. The circumstances under which the 
defendant actedr objectively viewed by a 
reasonable man rather than subjectively by 
the actual state of defendant's mind, were 
such as to evidence a depraved indifference 
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to human l i f e ; and 
4 . The defendant thereby unlawfully caused 
the death of another. 
In raD±3B3r an expert marksman was driving down the 
road and became angry with another driver who cut in front of h i s 
v e h i c l e . The marksman taunted the other driver for a d i s tance , 
then pulled bes ide him a t a s t o p l i g h t , aimed a gun at h i s head, 
and f i r e d . The Court found that the standard for depraved 
ind i f ference was met because the act c l e a r l y posed a grave risk 
of death and the marksman could not have f a i l e d to know of that 
r i sk . I d . at 1046. 
In S±a±fiL^.jaoiBiMfirr 699 P.2d 1214, 1219 (Utah 1985) 
the Court r e i t e r a t e d the standard for depraved indi f ference se t 
forth in fsufcaiis. However, in Bsl-SingfiXr the Court found that 
the standard was not met. In BDlsin&SXi the defendant and the 
decedent were involved in consensual sexual a c t i v i t i e s . The 
decedent was in t ere s t ed in sexual experimentation. The 
defendant, during in tercourse , wrapped an e l e c t r i c a l cord around 
the decedent 's neck and pul led l i g h t l y for a very short time 
causing a l o s s of blood to the decedent 's brain, which resul ted 
in her death. The expert testimony indic ted that the ease of the 
k i l l i n g was part ly due t o alcohol in the v i c t i m ' s system and 
part ly due to the fac t that the defendant was ly ing on top of her 
when the l i g a t u r e was appl ied . 
The Court in BslfiiligfiX emphasized that in order to be 
g u i l t y of second degree murder under the depraved indi f ference 
standard a defendant must JULDK that h i s conduct creates a grave 
risk of death to another. I d . at 1219. The Court concluded that 
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reasonable minds must entertain some doubt that the defendant 
knew that the very shortf light, ligature, compounded with the 
victim's intoxication and defendant's own weight, would pose a 
grave risk of death. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that 
the defendant could not be found guilty of second degree murder 
under the depraved indifference standard. Id. at 1220-21. 
The instant case is analogous to £ojifc3jQja. The evidence 
indicates that defendant knew that using the knife could cause 
grave risk of death. He even asked Mr. Shaffer if he would tell 
the police if such a stabbing occurred, a fact that not only 
demonstrates that defendant knew the knife was dangerous but 
shows that he considered the life he was endangering less 
important than the fact that he might get caught. Further, 
viewed from the prospective of a reasonable man, it is clear that 
using an unsheathed knife in a fight creates a grave risk of 
causing death. It is difficult to imagine that defendant, who 
admits that he liked to play with the knife, would be unaware of 
that danger. Consequently, the jury could easily have concluded 
that: defendant engaged in conduct that posed a grave risk of 
death to another; defendant knew that the conduct created such a 
risk; the circumstances under which the action was taken 
evidenced a depraved indifference to life—defendant contemplated 
the stabbing and his only concern was whether he would be 
reported to the police; and defendant thereby caused the death of 
Charles Bovee. Therefore, evidence was sufficient to support a 
verdict of second degree murder under § 76-5-203(c). 
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Defendant i n f e r s that the evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o 
support a v e r d i c t of second degree murder because Mr. Bovee was 
the i n i t i a l aggressor in the f i g h t against Mr. Otto. Defendant's 
argument i s d i f f i c u l t t o fo l low. He does not expla in why he was 
compelled t o enter the a l t e r c a t i o n between Otto and Bovee. He 
a l so does not expla in why he was forced to use an unsheathed 
knife t o defend against Bovee's bare f e e t and sheathed kni fe . In 
any event , the jury was thoroughly ins tructed on the law of s e l f 
defense (R. 5 9 - 6 1 ) . Defendant does not s t a t e why these 
i n s t r u c t i o n s were not adequate to a s s e r t h i s defense . In these 
circumstances, the State i s unable to discern the nature of 
defendant's complaint and the Court should refuse to speculate on 
an argument in order to reso lve an undefined i s s u e . Sss 5i3ifi^Yji 
Mi£S>L£, 689 P.2d 1341 f 1344 (Utah 1984) . 
Because the evidence was s u f f i c i e n t to support a 
f inding of second degree murder under any of the three c r i t e r i a 
s e t out in § 76-5 -203 , the j u r y ' s verd ic t should be affirmed. 
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT MET CONSTITUTIONAL 
STANDARDS FOR EFFECTIVE COUNSEL. THEREFORE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
This Court has made i t c l ear that "the dec i s ion to 
grant or deny a new t r i a l i s a matter of d i s c r e t i o n with the 
t r i a l court and w i l l not be reversed absent a c lear abuse of that 
d i s c r e t i o n . " SXaie^Xjt-YHllijaasr 24 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Dec. 9 f 
1985) . 
- 1 5 -
Defendant a s s e r t s that the t r i a l court abused i t s 
d i s c r e t i o n by refusing to grant a new t r i a l based upon h i s claim 
of i n e f f e c t i v e as s i s tance of counsel . Defendant claims that h i s 
counsel was i n e f f e c t i v e because: 1 . Defendant was the only 
wi tness c a l l e d on behalf of the defense; 2 . defendant purportedly 
t e s t i f i e d without adequate preparation by defense counsel; 3 . 
defense counsel f a i l e d t o make "timely objec t ions t o numerous 
p r e j u d i c i a l ques t ions , statements and ru l ings as he objected only 
once during the e n t i r e t r i a l ; " 4. defense counsel f a i l e d to ask 
that Juror Shir ley Smuin be dismissed for cause and f a i l e d to 
remove her with a peremptory chal lenge; 5. defense c o u n s e l f s 
opening and c lo s ing arguments were inadequate. Defendant's claim 
of i n e f f e c t i v e ass i s tance of counsel i s without meri t . 
Therefore f the t r i a l court did not abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n by 
refusing t o grant a new t r i a l based upon that c laim. 
In order to e s t a b l i s h i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s tance of counsel 
" i t i s the defendant's burden to show: (1) that h i s counsel 
rendered a d e f i c i e n t performance in some demonstrable manner, and 
(2) that the outcome of the t r i a l would probably have been 
d i f f erent but for counse l ' s error." S£a££-3*-G£axxr 707 P.2d 
645 f 646 (Utah 1985); s&s Alss S£Li£klan&-x*-.yashii&k2nf 
U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); S i 3 i £ . ^ 
LsiXtor 699 P.2d 1187, 1204 (Utah 1984) (adopting S±iiff]slaDd) ; 
CQdiaima-X^ltolxist 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) . Fai lure to 
show e i ther d e f i c i e n t performance or r e s u l t i n g prejudice w i l l 
defeat a claim of i n e f f e c t i v e counsel . JSJta±£_:£*_G£jaj:y, 707 P.2d 
a t 646. 
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In StLlSklandr the Supreme Court held thatr in order to 
show that counsel's performance was deficient, defendant must 
establish that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the 'counsel1 guaranteed by the sixth 
amendment." 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. The Supreme Court further noted 
that "scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential" id. at 694, and thatf due to the difficulties 
inherent in retrospectively evaluating counsel's performance, "a 
court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be 
considered sound trial strategy'." Id. at 693-94; s&s Also 5±sJt£ 
3*-BU£l, 700 P.2d 710, 703 (Utah 1985). 
The following discussion looks at each allegation on 
which defendant bases his claim of ineffective counsel and 
concludes that defendant, in every instance, fails to meet the 
burden of proof necessary to establish a violation of the sixth 
amendment right to effective counsel. Therefore, the trial court 
properly refused to grant a new trial based upon defendant's 
claim of ineffective counsel. 
The first allegation of ineffective counsel is based 
upon the fact that defendant was the only witness called on 
behalf of the defense. This allegation fails for three reasons. 
First defendant fails to show that, because defendant was the 
only witness called by the defense, counsel's performance was 
demonstrably deficient. Defendant has not brought to the Court's 
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attention any other witnesses who should have been called on 
defendant's behalf. Nor has he stated how the illusive missing 
witnesses' testimony would have had a bearing on the trial. This 
Court has refused to sustain a claim of ineffective counsel based 
on such opaque and unsupported allegations. In S±a±£_Y-*-.Laij:J3yr 
699 P.2d 1187, 1204 (Utah 1984), the defendant alleged that 
counsel was ineffective because he failed to attempt to impeach a 
State witness with prior inconsistent statements made at the 
preliminary hearing. This Court rejected the defendant's claim 
because he had not supplied the Court with the preliminary 
hearing transcript, had failed to explain the content of those 
statements, and had not stated how the statements would have been 
helpful. The Court held that, without more information, they 
could not consider whether the claimed error constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Similarly, in the 
instant case, without further information, it is impossible to 
determine whether failure to call witnesses, other than 
defendant, was improper. The Court is asked to speculate on the 
existence of such other witnesses and on the testimony they would 
give. In his opening statement, defense counsel admitted that 
all of the people, aside from defendant, who had witnessed or 
been involved in the incident in question, had been called by the 
State. Defense counsel said that, due to that circumstance, 
defendant would be the only witness called by the defense (Tr. 
233). That raises a presumption that defense counsel believed 
that all essential witnesses had testified. Because defendant 
has not explained who was omitted, or what they would have 
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testified aboutf he has not met his burden or proving that 
counsel was deficient in some demonstrable manner. 
In additionf defendant has failed to overcome the 
presumption that calling a single witness for the defense might 
be considered sound trial strategy. In fact, deciding what 
witnesses to call is one of the most important strategic 
decisions counsel makes. In the instant case, the State called 
several witnesses, including three people who saw the altercation 
in question. The only real issue at trial was whether defendant 
had the requisite mens rea for second degree murder. Defense 
counsel may very well have determined that the best, and perhaps 
the only, evidence of defendant's mental state would come from 
defendant's own testimony. Thus, the decision to call only 
defendant as a witness was likely a sound tactical choice. The 
fact that defense counsel's strategy did not produce the desired 
result does not lead to the conclusion that defendant was denied 
effective counsel. £t3±.e_Y.*_-&U£lr 70 0 P.2d at 703. Consequent-
ly, defendant has failed to show that defense counsel's 
performance did not meet constitutional standards. 
Finally, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the 
result of the trial would probably have been different if other 
witnesses had been called on defendant's behalf. As defense 
counsel noted in his opening statement, the State had called 
virtually all of the people who had either witnessed or 
investigated the stabbing of Charles Bovee. Consequently, it is 
unlikely that calling additional witnesses, with more attenuated 
links to the incident, could have made any difference in the 
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outcome of the trial. The only eyewitness that was not called at 
trial was William Otto* Defendant does not even attempt to 
explain how Mr. Otto's testimony could have impacted the outcome 
of the trial. In fact, absent such an explanation, it can 
reasonably be assumed that Mr. Otto's testimony would have been 
consistent with the testimony of the other three eyewitnesses. 
As merely cumulative evidence, it is unlikely that the testimony 
would have impacted the outcome of the trial in any way. 
Therefore, defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by 
counsel1s failure to call other witnesses on defendant's behalf. 
Defendant next claims that counsel was ineffective 
because counsel failed to adequately prepare him before he was 
called to testify. Defendant also claims that he did not 
understand that he had a right to refuse to testify. Even 
assuming that defendant was not extensively prepared before 
testifying, and that he did not understand he had the right to 
refuse to testify, defendant has not met his burden of proving 
that those shortcomings rendered counsel's performance 
ineffective in some demonstrable manner. Defendant makes no 
claim that his testimony would have been materially different if 
counsel had extensively prepared him before he was called to the 
witness stand. Nor does he claim that he would have chosen not 
to testify if he had understood that he had the right to refrain. 
In fact, it may be presumed that, if defendant told the truth on 
the witness stand, his testimony was not far different in 
substance than what would have been given if he had been coached 
by counsel. And, because defendant was the only witness 
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available to present his side of the story, it is likely that 
defendant would have chosen to testify even if he completely 
understood that he could refuse to do so. 
Furthermore, although coaching witnesses is a routine 
practice, the amount of preparation needed is a tactical decision 
to be made by counsel. A witness who has been coached may appear 
out-of-character or phony to a jury. The best tactic may be to 
let the witness give his testimony in a natural manner. 
Therefore, defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that 
the amount of witness preparation was not a tactical decision 
that fell within the realm of reasonable trial strategy. 
Finally, defendant has not established that, had he 
been more extensively prepared before testifying and had he 
understood that he could refuse to testify, the outcome of the 
trial would probably have been different. As noted above, it may 
be presumed that the substance of defendant's testimony would 
have remained the same, even with extensive coaching. 
Defendant's testimony indicates that, even though he does not 
believe he was adequately prepared, he was able to present his 
side of the story to the jury. Defendant's testimony included 
emphasis on the fact that he had been drinking all day before he 
stabbed Mr. Bovee (Tr. 246-250), and included his explanation 
that he had been struck nearly unconscious before he stabbed Mr. 
Bovee and that he did not intend to stab the victim (Tr. 253-54). 
Given that this information supported the defenses upon which 
defendant relied, it is unlikely that the testimony would have 
been materially different had he been coached before trial. 
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Consequently, it is unlikely that, had defendant been coached 
before he testified, the result of the trial would have been 
different. 
Furthermore even if defendant did not understand that 
he had a right to refuse to testify and assuming that he would 
not have testified had he understood this alternative, it is 
virtually certain that the verdict would have been the same 
without defendant's testimony. Without defendant's testimony, 
the evidence overwhelmingly indicated that defendant intended to 
stab his victim. Randy Shaffer testified that defendant asked if 
he would tell the police if defendant stabbed Bovee and Mr. 
Shaffer testified that defendant had threatened to "mess (Mr. 
Bovee) up." Further an eyewitness testified that during the 
fight defendant was waiving his knife around, threatening Mr. 
Bovee. Such testimony would lead a jury inescapably to the 
conclusion that defendant intended to kill Mr. Bovee or, at 
least, to cause him serious bodily injury-mandating a verdict of 
second degree murder. Defendant's own testimony was the only 
evidence that defendant did not intend to stab Mr. Bovee. Thus, 
without that testimony the jury would have certainly reached the 
same verdict that they reached with the testimony. Therefore, 
defendant has failed to prove that he was prejudiced by the 
alleged failure of counsel to inform him of his fifth amendment 
rights. 
Defendant next asserts that counsel's performance was 
inadequate because he failed to make "timely objections to 
numerous prejudicial questions, statements and rulings as he 
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objected only once during the whole t r i a l . " Defendant's 
a l l e g a t i o n i s , for the most part, completely unsubstantiated and, 
therefore , obviously does not prove that counse l ' s performance 
was d e f i c i e n t in some demonstrable manner. Defendant po ints to 
only once instance where he b e l i e v e s that object ions should have 
been raised that were not . In that ins tance , counsel objected to 
a leading quest ion asked by the prosecutor. The court sustained 
the o b j e c t i o n , adding that the prosecutor had "been leading a l l 
day" (Tr. 148) . 
I t has been e s tab l i shed that whether to object to 
leading quest ions i s a matter of t r i a l s t ra tegy . Counsel may 
decide that i t i s unwise to object as i t may draw undue a t tent ion 
to testimony that could be e l i c i t e d without leading ques t ions . 
££3££_Y^_£AE£l3f 141 Ariz . 97, 685 P.2d 734, 740 (1984); Stai^Y^. 
tt£Bl£S>l, 554 P.2d 203, 204-05 (Utah 1976) (the defendant claimed 
that counsel was i n e f f e c t i v e because he raised only one object ion 
to 165 leading or sugges t ive ques t ions . The Court held that 
counse l ' s ac t ions " f e l l within the ambit of an a t torney ' s 
l e g i t i m a t e exerc i s e of judgment as to t r i a l t a c t i c s or 
s tra tegy .") 
In the ins tant case , the object ionable leading question 
was intended to e l i c i t testimony about statements made by 
defendant to Randy Shaffer to the e f f e c t that he was considering 
stabbing Charles Bovee and was worried about whether Mr. Shaffer 
would t e l l the po l i ce about the stabbing. That testimony had 
previously been given in response to quest ions that were neither 
leading nor otherwise improper (Tr. 137 -38 ) . Defense counsel may 
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have concluded that repeated objections to the prosecutor's 
questions would do no more than emphasize the testimony for the 
jury. Therefore, defendant has failed to overcome the 
presumption that counsel's failure to object was a sound 
strategic decision. 
Further, the crucial evidence against defendant was 
elicited without leading or otherwise improper examination. That 
testimony included Mr. Shaffer's testimony that showed defendant 
intended to stab Mr. Bovee and the testimony of two other 
eyewitnesses who stated that it appeared that during the fight 
defendant and Mr. Otto fought together against the victim and 
that defendant danced around, waiving the knife, before he 
stabbed Mr. Bovee (Tr. 97-98; 114; 120; 137-38). Consequently, 
it is unlikely that, even if defense counsel had raised repeated 
objections to any leading questions, the result of the trial 
would have been different. Therefore defendant has not 
established that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object 
to leading questions. 
Defendant also asserts that counsel was ineffective 
because he did not request that juror Smuin be removed for cause 
and did not remove her with peremptory challenge. During voir 
dire the trial court asked if anyone felt that, because a person 
had been killed, defendant or someone was guilty. Ms. Smuin 
responded that she felt that, because someone had died, somebody, 
somewhere was guilty (Tr. 32). The court explained to the jury 
that they were to determine if it was defendant who was 
responsible for the death (Tr. 32). The trial court then asked 
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if anyone felt that defendant must be guilty because he was in 
court accused of the crime. Ms. Smuin responded negatively (Tr. 
33). Ms. Smuin also indicated that, if she were the defendant in 
this case, she would feel comfortable having a juror in her frame 
of mind try the case (Tr. 44)• 
It has been established that the decision to challenge 
a juror is a matter of trial technique jSJtfiY£X-^ «^5Jta±£# 674 P.2d 
566f 568 (Okla. Ct.Crim.App. 1984). In the instant case Ms. 
Smuin was extremely candid about her feeling that somebody was 
responsible if there was a deathf yet she maintained that she 
would be able to give defendant a fair trial and that she did not 
presume that he was responsible merely because he was accused. 
Counsel was present to view Ms. Smuin1s demeanor. He may very 
well have decided that Ms. Smuin1s candor reflected an honesty 
and ability for introspection that might actually be beneficial 
to defendant. That decision should not be second guessed by this 
Court as it may have been a valid exercise of trial strategy. 
Moreover, counsel need not raise futile objections. 
JCQdlAnn8LX*-.ltorxiBr 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983); fiiai£«^ 
Halmr£jS£* 649 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982). Ms. Smuin did not express 
feelings that would justify excusing her for cause. Therefore, 
counsel's failure to raise an objection for cause did not render 
his performance ineffective. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(13) & (14) (Utah Code Ann. § 77-
35-18(e)(13) & (14) (1982) set out two occasions when a 
prospective juror may be excused for cause due to bias. Utah R. 
Crim. P. 18(e)(13) states that a challenge for cause may be 
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granted i f the potent ia l juror "has formed or expressed an 
unquali f ied opinion or b e l i e f as to whether the defendant i s 
g u i l t y or not g u i l t y of the o f fenses charged". That s ec t i on i s 
not appl icable to the ins tant case . Ms. Smuin merely s ta ted that 
she be l i eved that somebody was responsible for the death (one 
might in fer that Ms. Smuin included the v ic t im himself as among 
the p a r t i e s who might be re spons ib l e ) ; she maintained that she 
did not have any preconceived not ions about defendant's g u i l t . 
Dtah R. Crim. P. 18(e ) (14) notes that f even where 
actual b ia s i s not shown, a p o t e n t i a l juror may be excused for 
cause i f "a s t a t e of mind e x i s t s on the part of the juror with 
reference to the cause, or to e i ther party, which w i l l prevent 
him from act ing impart ia l ly and without prejudice to the 
subs tant ia l r igh t s of the party chal lenging . . . " That standard 
has been interpreted to mean that a juror may be excused for 
cause i f he or she has formed "strong and deep impressions which 
w i l l c l o s e the mind against the testimony that may be offered in 
oppos i t ion to them, which w i l l combat that testimony and r e s i s t 
i t s f orce ." £±3i£_Y^_fi£Ki£±, 689 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 1984) ( c i t i n g 
S±fl±£_J^_BAileyr 605 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1 9 8 0 ) ) . B££-al£Q ££a££ 
YjL-LaCfiyr 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Utah 1983) , £JtfJ^x*_£rj&Q]js, 631 
P.2d 878 883 (Utah 1981) . Conversely, t h i s Court has 
acknowledged that a potent ia l juror should not be considered 
biased merely because he or she holds "(1) l i g h t impressions 
which may f a i r l y be supposed to y i e l d to the testimony that may 
be of fered; which may leave the mind open to a f a i r considerat ion 
of that test imony." StateSjL-Bailex, 605 P.2d at 767 ( c i t i n g 
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Chief J u s t i c e Marshall in BxuxlS-Ixial * at 416 ) . Unfortunately, 
there i s no bright l i n e between " l ight impressions" that w i l l not 
j u s t i f y excusing a juror for cause and "strong impressions" that 
w i l l . The ins tance in which t h i s Court has most frequently found 
"strong impressions" amounting to implied b ias i s where potent ia l 
jurors admit that they may be inc l ined to weigh testimony 
unequally. Such was the case in SJta±£_y.*_fietfiiir 689 P.2d a t 26 , 
where t h i s Court reversed the t r i a l court for f a i l u r e to dismiss 
a juror who declared that "if the evidence came anywhere near 
being c l o s e , then I would f e e l l i k e the d e t e c t i v e s deserve the 
benef i t of the doubt . . . " Such was a l s o the case in S±a±£_Yj. 
BAiley* 605 P.2d at 767-68, where t h i s Court held that i t was 
pre judic ia l error to refuse to excuse a juror who had s ta ted that 
he "probably would" give the testimony of a policeman more weight 
than the testimony of a wi tness who was not a policeman. 
S imi lar ly , in JisnkinS-Xjt-Saxxish, a medical malpractice case , the 
Court held that a potent ia l juror should have been excused for 
cause because she admitted that she would g ive more weight to the 
testimony of a wi tness simply because the witness was a doctor. 
627 P.2d 533, 536-537 (Utah 1981) . 
Other cases in which t h i s Court has found that the 
t r i a l court erred by refusing to excuse a juror for cause include 
ins tances where the impressions held by the potent ia l juror would 
by any standard f be considered strong enough to render the juror 
prejudiced. For ins tance , in Stat£-X*-.3xQQkSr a potent ia l juror 
reported that she had been a v ic t im of an armed robbery and 
a s s a u l t in her home. She s tated that her a s s a i l a n t had been 
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allowed t o go without punishment and that she had "a very strong 
f e e l i n g about tha t ." As a consequence of those f e e l i n g s , the 
p o t e n t i a l juror admitted that she "couldn't make an honest 
dec i s ion" about whether she could give the defendant the benef i t 
of the presumption of innocence but, contrary to what common 
sense d i c t a t e s , thought she could return a f a i r and impartial 
verd ic t 631 P.2d at 882-83. The Court held that refusing to 
d ismiss that juror for cause was error . IiL* at 884. S imi lar ly , 
in £x3ttfSliS-Y^-HaBDiJigr the Court expressed doubt over whether a 
juror who had admitted having "strong f e e l i n g s concerning anyone 
who would sue to recover money for the death of another" could be 
an impartial juror in a wrongful death s u i t . 542 P.2d 1091, 
1092-93 (Utah 1975) . 
On the other hand, t h i s Court on several occasions has 
refused to reverse a t r i a l cour t ' s dec i s i on to re ta in a juror who 
was challenged for cause. £££ ££a££-X*~B£Hi££r 6 89 P.2d at 25-
26; 5isi£-^-.LajC£yr 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Utah 1983) , JSJtSijB-^ 
XtelmiQSQt 649 P.2d 56, 70-6 (Utah 1983) . In those case s , the 
jurors in quest ion had some a t t r i b u t e that suggested that they 
were not t o t a l l y unacquainted with the people that might be 
involved in the t r i a l or that they harbored some l i g h t f e e l i n g s 
about the crime involved or about t h e i r a b i l i t y to perform as a 
juror . For ins tance , in Stat£^Sjt^Esvitt9 the Court concluded 
tha t , in a contro l l ed substance d i s t r i b u t i o n case , i t was not 
error to refuse to excuse a juror who had experience in 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g drug o f fenses in the Army because the juror 
maintained that , desp i te that experience , he could judge the case 
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impart ia l l y . 689 P.2d at 25-26 . And, in SJ^±£_Yj^Jtolfflr£.ser the 
Court held that a juror who was otherwise impartial should not be 
excused for cause merely because she questioned whether she 
should hear the c a s e . 949 P.2d at 61 . 
In the ins tant case the only indicat ion of implied bias 
on Ms. Smuin1s part was her statement that she be l i eved that , 
because someone died, somebody somewhere was g u i l t y . She 
maintained that she did not have any preconceived notion that 
defendant was the g u i l t y party and she maintained that she could 
give defendant a f a i r t r i a l . Those statements do not evidence 
strong impressions of the type that would j u s t i f y dismiss ing Ms. 
Smuin for cause. Instead, they evidence her w i l l i n g n e s s to be 
persuaded by the evidence. Therefore, a chal lenge for cause 
would not have been j u s t i f i e d and counsel properly decided not to 
ra ise such a chal lenge . Consequently, defendant has not met h i s 
burden of proving that counsel was i n e f f e c t i v e because he f a i l e d 
to chal lenge Ms. Smuin for cause. 
F i n a l l y , defendant a s s e r t s that defense counsel was 
i n e f f e c t i v e because h i s opening and c los ing arguments were 
inadequate. Defendant claims that the arguments were inadequate 
because: 1 . counsel f a i l e d to adequately argue defendant's theory 
of the case; 2 . counsel f a i l e d to point out that i n t o x i c a t i o n was 
an important factor to consider in determining defendant's g u i l t ; 
3 . counsel f a i l e d to ins truc t the jury on the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
second degree murder and manslaughter; and 4 . counsel did not 
adequately explain the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
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The dec i s ion of whether to make an opening and c lo s ing 
argument, and of how long those arguments are to be f i s a 
t a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n . £!±3±£_Y^_£lJ£i.£X£je.Zr 618 P.2d 315, 317 (Hawaii 
1980) . As a consequence, even absolute waiver of c lo s ing 
argument w i l l not be grounds for a f inding of i n e f f e c t i v e counsel 
because "in some cases the w i s e s t t r i a l t a c t i c i s to keep quiet" 
Sta££-.X±-EQ3£L£}1£Zr 138 Ariz. 495, 675 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Ariz. 
1984) . In the ins tant case , counsel decided to give a short 
opening statement that d irected the j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n to 
defendant's pending testimony (Tr. 233-34) . Counsel gave a 
rather ex tens ive c los ing argument that emphasized the f a c t s of 
the case and referred to the jury i n s t r u c t i o n s to expla in the law 
(Tr. 295-304) . 
In marshall ing the f a c t s for the jury, counsel 
emphasized the amount of alcohol defendant consumed before he 
k i l l e d Charles Bovee and noted t h a t , at the time of the stabbing, 
defendant's blood alcohol l e v e l was twice the amount permitted 
under the drunken driving s t a t u t e (Tr. 2 9 8 ) . He a l so pointed out 
that defendant had received a blow right before the stabbing, 
claiming that the blow stunned defendant, and that the f a t a l 
stabbing was an acc idental r e s u l t of reentering the a l t e r c a t i o n 
in such a stunned s t a t e with a knife in hand (Tr. 301 -02 ) . 
counsel repeatedly asserted that the evidence f a i l e d to show that 
defendant intended to stab the v ic t im (Tr. 302 , 303 , 3 0 4 ) . 
Counsel a l s o reminded the jury to keep the c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n on 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in mind and to look a t the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the d e f i n i t i o n of second degree murder and 
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the lesser included offenses of manslaughter and negligent 
homicide to determine exactly what crime defendant had committed 
(Tr. 303-05)• 
The jury was explicitly informed that what the 
attorneys said was not evidence (Tr* 49, 60f 282). Further, they 
were ordered to apply the law as it was set forth in the jury 
instructions (Tr* 267)* Therefore, it was a reasonable trial 
strategy for defense counsel to keep his arguments to a brief 
summary of the facts and to limit his discussion of the law to 
pointing out the jury instructions upon which he felt the jury 
should rely. Consequently, defendant has failed to overcome the 
presumption that counsel's opening and closing arguments fell 
within the realm of reasonable trial tactics. 
Moreover, none of the deficiencies defendant claims 
existed in counsel's argument hold up under scrutiny. The first 
claim is that counsel failed to adequately present defendant's 
theory of the case. This Court has held that such a broad, 
unsubstantiated, allegation will not support a finding of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Sss ££ai£_y^_L.aixb¥, 699 P.2d 
1187, 1204 (Utah 1984) (rejecting a claim of ineffective counsel 
based upon an allegation that counsel's inadequate arguments had 
denied the defendant the "opportunity to present the jury with an 
intelligent, cohesive description of their case."). Next, 
defendant complains that counsel failed to point out that 
intoxication was a factor to consider in determining the case. 
This claim is patently untrue as counsel's closing argument 
emphasized that defendant had been drinking extensively and was, 
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in fact, legally intoxicated when the stabbing occurred, 
Furthermoref even if counsel failed to adequately inform the jury 
of the defense of intoxication, the failure could not have 
affected the verdict because jury instruction 11, (Tr. 276), 
specifically noted that defendant claimed that he was intoxicated 
at the time of the offense and set out the standard for a defense 
of intoxication. Defendant's two final contentions, that 
counsel's argument was defective in that it failed to outline the 
distinctions between second degree murder and manslaughter and 
failed to explain the standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, are also groundless. Defense counsel specifically 
directed the jury's attention to the court's instructions on 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and on the definition of second 
degree murder and the lesser included offenses. In addition, 
even if counsel were required to do more than direct the jury's 
attention to the relevant law as set out by the court, that 
shortcoming could have had no effect on the outcome of the trial 
because the trial court thoroughly instructed the jury on the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (Jury Instructions 3 
& 4, Tr. 267-68) and on the definition of second degree murder 
and the lesser included offenses of manslaughter and negligent 
homicide (Jury Instructions 6-10, Tr. 269-76). Consequently, any 
further argument on those points would have been merely 
cumulative and there is no reasonable likelihood that it would 
have changed the jury's verdict. Therefore, defendant has failed 
to establish that any shortcoming in counsel's opening or closing 
arguments rendered his performance constitutionally inadequate. 
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Furthermore, looking a t defense counse l ' s performance 
on the whole, i t i s apparent that he zea lous ly and competently 
represented defendant. Before t r i a l , counsel succeeded in 
convincing the court to suppress evidence that was obtained in 
v i o l a t i o n of defendant's r ight to privacy (R. 3 4 - 3 5 ) . During 
t r i a l , counsel cross-examined ten out of the t h i r t e e n wi tnesses 
c a l l e d by the S t a t e . At the end of the S t a t e ' s case , counsel 
moved for d ismissal on the grounds that , by f a i l i n g to prove the 
necessary mens rea, the State had f a i l e d to make out a prima 
f a c i e case of second degree murder (Tr. 264-65) . In view of the 
strong evidence against defendant, i t i s not surpris ing that 
defense counse l ' s s trategy did not p r e v a i l . 
In re trospec t , defendant a s s e r t s that counsel could 
have done things d i f f e r e n t l y . But "Etlhe object of an 
i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s claim i s not to grade counse l ' s performance." 
£±ai£-^_Lsij:byr 699 at 1204 ( c i t i n g Stiicklan^s^^ashingtsn, 
104 S.Ct. at 2070) . However he f a i l s t o prove that the 
performance was i n e f f e c t i v e in some demonstrable manner, f e l l 
outs ide the realm of reasonable t r i a l t a c t i c s , or was inadequate 
in such a way that i t impacted the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . Consequently, 
defendant f a i l e d t o prove that counse l ' s performance was 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d e f i c i e n t and the t r i a l court properly refused 
to grant a new t r i a l based upon defendant's claim of i n e f f e c t i v e 
counsel . 
- 3 3 -
£QB£LS2IQB 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the judgment of the 
court below should be affirmed. 
Dated this _P_S„ day of April, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
vO^r & 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Ass i s tan t Attorney General 
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